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Abstract- This paper seeks to study the relation between 
board of director characteristics as a corporate 
governance mechanism and earnings management in 
the Malaysian scenario. Earnings management is 
measured by discretionary accruals and for estimating 
discretionary accruals, Modified Jones Model is used. 
Board of directors’ characteristics includes number of 
meetings, existence of outside directors, financial 
expertise and separation of the roles of chair and chief 
executive officer. In this study, the multiple linear 
regressions have been used. To test the hypothesis, 
cross-sectional and pooled data of 71 companies listed 
in Bursa Malaysia from 2001 to 2005 were used. The 
results demonstrate that financial expertise are 





No doubt the advent of joint-stock companies in the 
industrial world is one of the biggest economic 
developments and probably the most important factor 
of industrial development. Separation of ownership 
from administration, existence of natural difference 
in the function of their desirability resulting into the 
contrariety of benefits and thus forming owner-agent 
relationship and agency theory are the outcome of 
this phenomenon. Since the very day the problem of 
the interference of rights in general and the risk of 
rights of minority shareholders to be lapsed by high 
level influential shareholders specifically has been an 
important owner agent difficulty in most of the 
countries. Scandals of accounting and the downfall of 
companies like Enron, World Com of America and 
Tel Van Company in Australia has brought forth 
serious anxieties about earnings management, 
making use of the reported profit and moral problems 
of those who audit and prepare these reports. 
Legislative organizations in Australia and America 
reacted against bankrupt companies and disclosed 
embezzlement by improving the principle of 
corporate governance. For the same purpose U.S.A in 
July 2002 to respond to the above mentioned 
bankruptcy levied the law of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Regarding these reactions it is expected  that earnings 
management and corporate governance mechanisms 
are highly interrelated. This  research is focused on 
achieving the effectiveness of some of these 
mechanisms and methods on the decline of earnings 
management. Identifying the ways and means having 
an impact on the decline of earnings management is 
very important. It is so that the investors being 
doubtful about the impartiality of the given 
information will behave more conservatively and 




In case of the relationship between earnings 
management and infrastructure of corporate 
governance, research work in Malaysia is an ongoing 
basis. Mashaikh and Ismaili (2006) did not find any 
significant relation between quality of the earnings 
along with the ownership percentage of the board of 
directors and number of the outside directors. As 
compared to the research work in Malaysia and 
expanded work has been done externally about the 
relation between corporate governance and earnings 
management. Here the paper briefly take a look at 
these studies: Beasley (1996) showed that as outside 
director ownership in the corporation and outside 
director tenure on the board augment and as the 
number of outside directorships in other firms held 
by outside directors decreases, the probability of 
financial statement fraud decreases. Vafeas (1999) 
found that board meeting frequency has a relationship 
with corporate governance and ownership 
characteristics in a way that is consistent with 
contracting agency theory. Chtourou et al. (2001) 
concluded that income decreasing earnings 
management has a negative relationship with the 
presence of at least a member with financial expertise 
and a clear mandate for overseeing both the financial 
statements and the external audit. For the board of 
directors, they found that less income increasing 
earnings management in firms whose outside board 
members have experience as board members with the 
firm and with other firms. Klein (2002) examined 
whether audit committee and board characteristics 
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are related to earnings management by the firm. He 
found a negative relation between board 
independence and abnormal accruals. Reductions in 
board or audit committee independence were 
accompanied by great increases in abnormal accrual. 
Xie et al. (2003) show that board and audit 
committee members with corporate or financial 
backgrounds are related with firms that have smaller 
discretionary current accruals. Board and audit 
committee meeting frequency is also related with 
reduced levels of discretionary current accruals. They 
also found that board and audit committee activity 
and their members' financial sophistication may be 
pivotal factors in constraining the propensity of 
managers to be involved in earnings management. 
Park and Shin (2004) found that earnings are 
managed upward to prevent reporting losses and 
earnings declines. While outside directors, as a 
whole, do not decreases abnormal accruals, directors 
from financial intermediaries decreases earnings 
management, and the board representation of active 
institutional shareholders decreases it further. 
Agrawal and Chadha’s (2005) findings are consistent 
with the idea that independent directors with financial 
expertise are important in providing oversight of a 
firm's financial reporting practices. Peasnell et al. 
(2005) stated that in the U.K. outside directors are 
effective in constraining earnings management only 
after the issuance of the Cadbury Committee Report. 
Chen et al. (2007) examined whether corporate 
governance characteristics, mandated by the 
Corporate Governance Best- Practice Principles 
(CGBPP) for companies which were listed in 
Taiwan, are associated with earnings management. 
They examined, particularly whether the 
independence, financial expertise, and voluntary 
formation of independent directorship are associated 
with the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
Their findings conveyed that the independence of 
supervisors, financial expertise of independent 
directors, and voluntary formation of independent 
directorship are associated with lower probability of 
earnings management. These findings are stronger 
after the CGBPP was enacted, suggesting that the 
implementation of CGBPP has decreased the 
probability of earnings management. Cornett et al. 
(2008) found that Earnings management reduces 
when there is more monitoring of management 
discretion from sources like institutional ownership 
of shares, institutional representation on the board, 








H1: There is a significant relation between 
discretionary accrual and the number of meetings 
held by the board of directors in the company. 
 
H2: There is a significant relation between 
discretionary accrual and existence of outside 
directors in the combination of the board. 
 
H3: There is a significant relation between 
discretionary accrual and the level of financial 
expertise. 
 
H4: There is a significant relation between 
thediscretionary accrual and presence or absence 
of the managing director as a chief or vice chief 




The present research is descriptive and a type of 
multiple variable correlation. Data has been analyzed 
in the pooled manner and composed data form while 
cross-sectional analysis (yearly study) has also been 
performed. Multiple linear regression model have 
been used to test the research hypothesis. Statistical 
community of the research was whole sum of the 
companies recognized by Bursa Malaysia during 
2001 to 2005. It is also required that the fiscal 
information especially the notes along with account 
statements must be accessible to extract the required 
data including accounts of discretionary accrual. 
According to the above mentioned conditions, 
131companies were selected as the statistical 
community. The sample size was also selected from 
71 companies by using the sampling formulae of 
limited Random methodology. Data and the financial 
information were used in the analytical studies. 
Information relevant to earnings management of 
companies was obtained by Bursa Malaysia and 
internet site of the organization. Information 
concerned with the characteristics of the board of 
directors up to accessibility was extracted from 
reports of the summary of the decisions made by the 
common general assembly issued by stock exchange 
annual report of the board of directors presented to 
the common general assembly of the shareholders. 
Remaining information has been obtained directly 
from the companies under study. Modified Jones 
model (Dechow and others 1995) has been used to 
estimate discretionary accrual. Jones has recognized 
the difference between the income and cash flow 
operation as discretionary accrual: 
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TAit = Eit – CFOit 
 In this formula the variables are: 
 
TAit: total accrual of firm i in period t 
Eit: net income prior to extraordinary items of firm 
i in period t 
CFOit: cash flow operation of firm i in period t 
 
On the other side, to estimate α1, α2 and α3 which 
are the specific estimated parameters of the 
company, the following formula is used: 
 
TAit =  α1 (1/Ait −1 ) + α2 (ΔREV/Ait −1) +  
α3(PPEit /Ait − 1 ) +  εi,t 
 
Ultimately, for the appraisal of discretionary accrual, 
non- discretionary accrual must be 
Estimated\ through the following formulae: 
 
NDAit = α1 (1/Ait −1 ) + α2 [(ΔREV-ΔREC)/Ait −1 
] + α3 (PPEit /Ait −1 ) + εi,t 
 
In the two formulas above: 
ΔREC: changes in receivables accounts of firm i in 
period t and t-1 
Ait −1: total assets of firm i in period t-1  
ΔREV: changes in revenue of firm i in period t and  t-
1  
NDAit: non-discretionary accrual of firm i in periodt 
PPEit: net property, plant and equipment of firm i in 
period t 
εi,t = residual for company i in year t. 
 
For the appraisal of parameters α1, α2, and α3 to 
estimate discretionary accrual, the Excel 
and SPSS software had been used. By deducting non-
discretionary accrual from total 
accrual we get discretionary accrual. So discretionary 
accrual is estimated by using modified 




Independent variables of research are defined and 
estimated as following: 
The meetings held by the board of directors: The 
number of meetings held by the members of the 
board of directors. Percentage of the outside 
directors: Proportion of outside directors to board 
member Level of the financial expertise of board 
members: Number of the managers who have 
university degree in any major of accounting or 
management or at least two years expertise of 
financial affairs. Presence or absence of the 
managing director as chief or vice chief executive of 
the board: In case the managing director in a 
company is the chief or vice chief executive of the 
board we use artificial variable No1 and if he is not 
possessing this post, artificial variable zero will be 
used. Ultimately to test the hypothesis multiple linear 
regression has been used. Four tests of the hypothesis 
have been performed respectively by 1st, 2nd, 3rd 
and 4th model: 
 
1) DAit = s0 + s3 MEET+ ε 
 
2) DAit = c0 + c1 OUTDIR+ ε 
 
3) DAit = f0 + f2 FINEXPER + ε 
 





In the present research discretionary accrual of 
modified Jones model has been used. First for 
appointing the discretionary accrual data of  71 
companies from 2001 to 2005 was gathered around 
and then coefficients of the model; α1, α2, a3 have 
been assigned by SPSS software. Table1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of data to be studied to estimate 
parameters of modified Jones model and usage of 
linear regression. Tables 4 and 5 indicate the 
descriptive statistic of discretionary accrual.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics related with the 










TAit   / Ait
−1
0.0459 0.750 -0.655 0.164 
1/ Ait −1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ΔREVit   /
Ai 1
0.143 1.320 -0.501 0.226 
PPEit   / Ait
−1
0.329 1.269 0.000 0.227 
 
According to Tables 2 and 3, results of statistical 
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17.017 2.049 0.000 
 
 
It is observed in Table 2 that F statistic, 17.017 and 
related significant level is zero and its comparison 
with 0.05 error level indicates the regression model is 
significant which indicates the significance of 
goodness fit index of regression model is verified at 
95% assurance level. R square shows that 
independent variables explain about 0.129 variations 
in dependent variable. Durbin Watson statistic 
indicates that no correlation among the error particles 
of regression model  is found. Likewise, regarding 
the rate of tolerance and VIF in Table 3, it is 
observed that no correlation exists among 
independent variables. The number related to VIF 
should be near to 1 but being more than 30 means 








Table3: Result of Regression 
 
 Corfficient t. statistic Tolerance VIF Sig.
α 1 1465.975 3.736 0.874 1.144 0.000
α 2 0.209 5.853 0.764 1.308 0.000
α 3 -0.052 -2.035 0.682 1.467 0,043
 













DA 347 0.671 -0.50 0.025 0.164 
      
 
 
Table 5:Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable as Cross Sectional 
 
2001 N Max Min Mean Std Deviation 
Discretionary 
Accrual 
68 0.32 -0.507 -0.013 0.149 
2002 N Max Min Mean Std Deviation 
Discretionary 
Accrual 
71 0.418 -0.35 -0.008 0.145 
2003 N Max Min Mean Std Deviation 
Discretionary 
Accrual 
70 0.41 -0.276 -0.014 0.144 
2004 N Max Min Mean Std Deviation 
Dicretionary 
Accrual 
70 0.671 -0.423 0.08 0.215 
2005 N Max Min Mean Std Deviation 
Discretionary 
Accrual 
68 0.613 -0.401 0.024 0.141 
 
 
Table 6: Result of SPSS Test 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled 
Sig 0.371 0.969 0.785 0.761 0.256 0.217 
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Table 7: Result of H1 Test 1 
 








Coefficient F Stat Sig Durbin 
Watson 
Result 
2001 920 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.017 0.896 2.362 Reject 
2002 985 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.720 0.399 1.778 Reject 
2003 971 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.799 0.381 2.010 Reject 
2004 973 0.006 0.016 0.002 0.366 0.547 1.978 Reject 
2005 940 0.001 0.016 0.001 0.039 0.843 2.001 Reject 
Pooled 4789 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.229 0.633 1.985 Reject 
 
Findings of tests of hypothesis 
 
One of the conditions of using regression model is 
that the dependent variable be normal. The normality 
of data was studied by using the SPSS software.The 
results of this test have been given in Table 6.As the 
obtained significant level in every year is more than 
the considerate significant level (0.05), therefore we 
an say that dependence variable of the research 
i.e.,discretionary accrual,is normal.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
Based upon the above data, results of the research 
display no relation between the number of meetings 
held by the board of directors and discretionary 
accrual. Thus my results do not coincide with the 
results of Xie and others (2003) because they found  
when members of the board have frequent  meetings, 
discretionary accrual decreases. In this research, no 
relation was found between the number of meetings 
and discretionary accrual. I believe that this may 
result from the fact that members of  the  board, 
having no appeal for extra sittings, intend only to 
reach at the fixed least limit of holding meeting. As 
given in the constitution of most of the  companies, 
the least level of meetings to be held is once a month 
and most of the firm desire to fulfill the very least 
.And other argument may be lack of an organized 
system to hold the meetings of  board and thus 
enhancing this disconnection.Second hypothesis was 
nullified. Presence of outside directors in the 
combination of executive  board is important because 
their benefits are not contrary to the interests of the 
company. So they can play an effective role of 
supervisor by judging and solving the decisions of 
directors quite professionally and impartially. 
Whether outside directors in Malaysia perform their 
role of supervision or not, is an important point to be  
considered. If they just participate in decision making 
and ignore from their guardianship their effectiveness 
can decrease significantly. On the other way, 
simultaneous membership of most of the outside  
 
members of the board of directors in some other 
companies can also decrease their effectiveness. 
Based upon the principle of corporate governance 
regulation draft, in big companies at least 2 persons 
and in all others at least 1 person from the members 
of the board of directors must be from independent 
manager. In this research, the managers who have no 
executive post are defined as outside directors and it 
is supposed that they are independent from firm 
while it may be possible that  they have ties with the 
company. For example, in practice many of them 
might be appointed as  managing director or chief 
executive of the board by the big companies. It is also 
possible that they have a kind of association with the 
company due to long term membership in the board 
of directors. Therefore the traditional differences in 
defining the terminology of 'executive managers' and 
'outside directors' may be unable to identify the 
potential oppositeness of interests between outside 
managers and the company where they are present as 
a member of the board. Third hypothesis was 
confirmed. I expect a relationship between financial 
expertise level and discretionary accrual but 
important debate is; why this relation is positive. 
From my point of view this may result from the fact 
that most of the members with financial expertise 
were of employed  cadre while a number of 
companies did not have even a single outside 
manager possessing financial expertise. In most of 
the literature debating corporate governance, for 
example, in principle of corporate governance 
regulation draft in Malaysia, it is recommended that 
in the combination of the members of the board there 
must be at least one outside member having B.A in 
accounting, fiscal policy or administration 
experiences. Fourth hypothesis of this research was 
rejected. Results of the studies of Chtourou et al. 
(2001) indicate that there lies a positive relation 
between earning management and the existence of 
managing director as chief executive of the board. In 
the view of the research worker the rejection of the 
hypotheses might be due to the fact that duty of 
managing director and the chief executive of the 
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board of directors have not been differentiated fully. 
In Malaysia ,the board of directors, both traditionally 
and based upon the trade law, is liable to 
administrative and strategies duties (but in practice 
mostly executive responsibilities).Board of directors 
is supposed to compose strategy, gain assurance 
about the maintenance of fiscal and human resources 
while evaluating the performance of managers and 
controlling the risk. So chief executive of the board is 
liable to be sure of performing above mentioned 
duties and effective contact with shareholders while 
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